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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
RICHARD UGELOW: Let me introduce Terry Connors who’s leading the 
next panel, and he too will introduce the distinguished panelists. Terry and I 
share something in common; we started in the [ELS] on the same day. The only 
problem was that Terry came from Air Force JAG, which is an inferior branch 
of the military, and I came from the Army JAG and it was [superior.] Terry 
had a really distinguished career at the [ELS]. He prosecuted cases against 
. . . Maryland, Michigan, and [the] New Jersey State Police for race and sex 
discrimination; and worked on the AT&T case.1 After he left the Section in 
1976, he went into private practice in Florida. He’s now co-head of a labor and 
employment practice, the Miami offi ce of Hunton & Williams. He’s worked 
extensively in employment throughout his professional career and he’s written 
extensively on employment discrimination and [he] participates in many 
professional organizations dealing with employment discrimination issues. 
Terry?  
TERRY CONNORS: Thank you, Richard. The truth is that the reason I 
was invited was because on my fi rst day at the Civil Rights Division I reported 
late for work to Mr. Rose, as I knew him at the time, and he wanted to know 
why. I’d just settled on my fi rst house purchase, so I didn’t need to get fi red, 
but he said “well, we don’t—we haven’t hired many people before that have 
already tried cases, so here’s a fi le involving the City of Albuquerque, and why 
don’t you take a look at it and why don’t you go out and handle it?” So having 
nothing to say, I said, “well, what happens if I lose?” and he said, “we don’t.” 
But I did. Actually, I think Brian Landsberg lost it, because he touched it last. 
1. EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d 1977).
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But in any event, that was the religious discrimination case, and—and I think 
maybe the only one ever brought [there].2 
On the State Police, and building on the very good work you heard described 
this morning, by the time [I] got [to] the State Police agencies, the heavy lifting 
had largely been done on the Griggs3 issues and so forth; and I recall that I 
discovered something that we didn’t have in [the] Judge Advocate’s court, 
which is request to admit. And so I prepared this extensive request to admit that 
essentially meant that we won the case. And to my great surprise, Michigan 
signed it. 
So I didn’t know quite what to do next, except I went out and November 
11th happens to be Veteran’s Day and that year my wife’s 30th birthday. And 
we got to a point in the discussions—Gerald Ford was newly in the White 
House—where the Attorney General of Michigan and the Chief of the State 
Police yelled at me across the room that “Jerry Ford would never require us to 
do what you’re asking us to do in this settlement, and we’re just not going to 
discuss it with you; we’re going to talk to him.” So it was November 10th, and 
I was supposed to be taking somebody to dinner in Washington the next night, 
but I said, “well, I actually don’t know the President, but why don’t we do this: 
let’s adjourn for today and you call Jerry and . . . one of two things will happen. 
Either I will go home and have birthday dinner with my wife, or we’ll be back 
here tomorrow morning talking about this, depending on what he says.” And 
we came back and talked about it the next day, so we did resolve the case, so 
thank you for the heavy lifting everybody.
Our group is—I want to introduce them all at once because I think we’ll 
bounce back and forth a little bit . . . and I’ll start to my immediate right: 
Marybeth Martin, who has held Section responsibilities, having started in 
1970 as a research analyst—and worked on numerous cases—then moved 
on [to] another career, became a lawyer later, returned as a lawyer in the 
Section and prosecuted numerous cases before she retired there in . . .  
 MARYBETH MARTIN: 2003. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Next to her, Jerry George, [who was with the Civil 
Rights Division of the DOJ from] 1969 through . . . 
JERRY GEORGE: 1988. 
 TERRY CONNORS: 1988, and then [he went] to the Environmental 
and Natural Resources Division and off to private practice in San Francisco 
after that, handling many cases involving police and fi re departments in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, St. Louis, and others. Vivian Toler, next to Jerry, was 
a research analyst and worked through the entirety of her career I think until 
[her] retirement  . . .  
2. United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975), aff’d, 545 
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976).
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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VIVIAN TOLER: [in] 2007. 
 TERRY CONNORS: In 2007, when at the end of her career she was 
responsible for all the research assistants—by then called paralegals—working 
on many cases including the gaming industry, the fi lm industry, and putting 
together the analysis models for the various remedial relief programs that the 
[ELS] sought. And to her right, Mike Middleton, [who was] in the [ELS] from 
1971 to [19]78, currently on [the] faculty at the University of Missouri, and 
we’ll focus, among his many accomplishments, on the City of Jackson4 case, 
if you will. And if I may, Mike, could you start off to talk about that one? 
 MIKE MIDDLETON: Sure. Thanks, Terry. I’m really happy to be here. I 
was at a gathering of the Civil Rights Division a few years ago in Washington 
and I was impressed with that gathering and I’m equally impressed with this 
one and I am very grateful for the experience. What people have said about 
Dave Rose and the folks who taught us all what we were doing; it’s hard to 
express how infl uential they were on us and as I look around the room and see 
all my former colleagues and see all the success they’ve had—I think all can 
be attributed to Dave. His work ethic. His nurturing attitude towards folks. 
And his deep, deep intelligence. And deep, deep commitment to these issues.
Like Terry said, by the time we started working, most of the heavy lifting 
was done. The law had been pretty much established, the seniority systems had 
been—at least the framework for analyzing [the] seniority systems—had been 
worked out. Adverse impact theory had been worked out.5 And it was simply a 
matter of fi nding the right targets and going after them. I had some experience 
in several different areas, and I’ll briefl y describe some of those cases. But 
what I think I really want to say is the pictures that were on the screen at the 
beginning of this session the white/colored bathrooms, the colored only movie 
theater. You may think that that was long, long ago, but the fact of the matter is 
the cases that I worked on, the discrimination was so clear and so in-your-face, 
that it made the cases not only easy to do, but a lot of fun to really challenge 
that kind of stuff.
My fi rst trial I tried with Bob Gallegher and Dave Allen; and Kathy Green 
was our research analyst on that case. It was in Detroit, Detroit Edison.6 [This 
is from when] we began going to the public utility companies. Detroit Edison 
was a major electricity provider in the Detroit area. We also did the Philadelphia 
Electric Company,7 [which was the] same kind of case. The fundamental issue 
there was [that] obviously the good jobs went to whites and the menial jobs, 
if [any] at all, went to blacks. I will never forget the Detroit-Edison trial. We 
managed to fi nd a star witness, a gentleman named Leroy Bell. And by the 
4. United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975). 
5. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
6. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d sub nom. 
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977) 
(remanding for further consideration in light of Supreme Court’s decision in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (citation omitted)).
7. United States v. Phila. Electric Co., 351 F. Supp. 1394 (E.D. La. 1972).
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way, the way we found witnesses, I think someone mentioned. You had to 
develop a really good relationship with the local NAACP and some of the local 
organizations because they knew where the people were.
So whenever you would go into a city, you would contact the NAACP 
or [Congress of Racial Equality] or some community organization that was 
involved in civil rights, explain what you were doing, [and] explain what you 
were looking for. [We would] try to develop a trusting relationship with those 
groups because we were the federal government, and of course we’re here 
to help you. They didn’t always buy that. But, they put us in touch with a 
gentleman named Leroy Bell [in Detroit].  
Leroy Bell had been in World War I; he was trained as an electrician in 
the war. He came out of the war and went to his home[town] of Detroit, and 
applied for a job at the electric company. He was told [that] he was black. He 
was told that there was one job at the Detroit Edison Company that a black 
man could have. But they already had a shoeshine boy. And if he were to wait 
around; if this gentleman ever left, they would consider him for the job. Well 
obviously he was our star witness, I mean. But that’s how simple the case was. 
Their policy was you didn’t get to be a lineman if you were black, no matter 
what your qualifi cations. The other interesting thing about that case was [that] 
Damon Keith was our judge. A very distinguished African-American judge, 
and when I saw him I immediately got very relaxed. But somewhere during 
Mr. Bell’s testimony, the question was raised, well, how about black women? 
And he mentioned well, black women could work there, but the job[s] for 
black women [were as] elevator operator[s]. And they had two elevators in the 
building, and there were women in those jobs. Well the defense counsel was 
trying to challenge him and ask [confusing questions]. Judge Keith interrupted. 
And he said, “Well I know something about that; my sister was an elevator 
operator at Detroit Edison.” So it was a good case, and it was a lot of fun. 
Needless to say we won that case.
Some of the other things—someone mentioned the airline cases. I worked 
on three airline cases: TWA,8 Delta,9 and United,10 with Susan Reeves, and 
eventually Doug Huron . . . got on those cases. I don’t want to tell the story 
of how I was second chair on United and Susan left. Dave Rose turned to 
Doug, who had just completed some major case and asked Doug to take fi rst 
chair. I was of course quite outraged, because I thought I was ready for that. 
And I went in and talked to Dave about it, and I was railing about how he was 
mistreating me. It turned out that he was absolutely right. Doug was eminently 
more qualifi ed to do that than I was. The only advice Dave gave me as we 
were arguing in his offi ce was, “Mike, don’t do anything precipitous.” I had 
to go back to my offi ce and fi nd out what he was trying to tell me. I didn’t do 
anything precipitous, and it all worked out. [B]ut Doug, I have always admired 
you and appreciate the leadership you gave on that case, and I confess even 
today that you were eminently more qualifi ed than I to take the lead on that.
But the airline cases are pretty easy too. [B]asically blacks were redcaps or 
8.  Zipes v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
9. Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
10. Lansdale v. United Airlines, 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971).
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baggage handlers, and the big jobs were ramp servicemen. [Ramp servicemen 
were] much more highly paid [and the jobs were] much more attractive. But 
the policies were that, you know, African-Americans simply need not apply for 
those jobs. And there was that inexorable zero in terms of black participation 
in those jobs. 
The other aspect of the [airline] case[s] we were beginning to get into 
enforcing was the gender discrimination portions of Title VII. Women were 
always . . . stewardesses—not fl ight attendants, stewardesses. They had 
stewards and stewardesses and reservations agents. And again, the patterns 
were clear. Women were not in any jobs other than those two. Those were the 
lowest paying jobs. And there were some side issues about appearance, height, 
and weight requirements for stewardesses that were not related to one’s ability 
to get down the aisle and serve passengers but more related to the physical 
attractiveness of the woman. There were age, height, and weight requirements 
for the fl ight attendants. It was fun challenging those because there was really 
no justifi cation other than discriminatory attitude on the parts of people. And 
we—I think—settled all those cases. The other thing about what we did at 
the Division was we really prepared our cases well. And once you had the 
evidence together, a defendant really had to be crazy to go to trial. Because it 
was quite clear what the outcome would be if the judge was going to analyze 
the case properly.
And I’ve got to give credit to Marybeth and Vivian and other research 
analysts that we had in the Division then, because they did all that legwork 
to put the statistical cases together and kept the cases organized. But the 
case[s] I had [the] most fun with [were] the police cases. I think I had one 
of the fi rst local government police cases in the City of Jackson, Mississippi, 
which was my hometown, so I knew something about it. I had two friends, 
Frank Parker, who was the head of the lawyer’s committee in Jackson. He had 
sued the police department, and Mel Leventhal, who was the counsel for the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, had sued the fi re department.11 [Both were] race 
discrimination cases. I wanted to go home and do something in my hometown. 
Dave authorized me to go down and investigate but he told me that if I were 
able to do it by myself with, I think, one research analyst, I could try it. 
So I went to Jackson and, on my way to the city attorney’s offi ce to introduce 
myself, I went by the employment offi ce on a whim. I had a big afro and 
I was about twenty-fi ve years old, maybe. And I asked the lady, I said “I’d 
like to apply for a job with the City of Jackson. May I have an application, 
please?” She said, “Boy, that’s not the way you get jobs in Jackson. If you 
want a job, you have to go stand under the viaduct on Highway Forty-Nine 
before seven o’clock on any morning, and there’s a truck that’ll come by. 
And if there’s work, you hop on the truck. And if there’s not, you come back 
the next day.” I dutifully took my notes, and said “Okay.” I then went over 
to the City Attorney’s Offi ce and announced myself and told him what we 
were doing. Ultimately we settled that case. We focused on the fi re and police 
departments, because there were two private suits in existence at the time. And 
11. Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Corley v. Jackson 
Police Dep’t, 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); United States v. City of Jackson, 
519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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it’s amusing, we talk about quotas and goals and timetables; we pretty quickly 
got an agreement out of the City of Jackson to hire—all future hires in the 
police department had to be on a one for one basis—Black/White. And in the 
fi re department, two for one—two blacks for every white. We got that signed. 
Fortunately we didn’t have Judge Cox [on] that. I don’t know if any of you 
know Judge Cox, but I had some dealings with him several years later where I 
had to move to recuse him from some cases because of his racism. And fi nally 
[we] won that [case] in the Fifth Circuit.
But those were the days. The discrimination was obvious. The legal theories 
had been pretty much ironed out by our predecessors on the prior panel and 
others, and it was a great deal of fun to do those cases. Another little anecdote, 
I think I talked about the NAACP, and the research analysts. I have to tell 
you, the FBI was very, very, very helpful during those days. You can imagine 
a young black attorney running around Jackson, Mississippi or Birmingham, 
Alabama and Mobile, Alabama; trying to interview witnesses can be diffi cult. 
It was always very nice to be able to write a memo to J. Edgar Hoover and ask 
him to have his people go do the interviews. And the FBI did a very, very good 
job of following the script and getting vital information from basically anyone 
who was involved in any of these cases. White policemen, black applicants, 
black deterred applicants . . . the FBI had a way of walking around a community 
and getting people to talk, so their expertise was extremely useful. 
Someone mentioned that we should talk about expert witnesses. I don’t 
know that I have much to say about that except that it was often very diffi cult 
to fi nd experts who could do what needed to be done. But I think it was more 
diffi cult for the defendants. In the Philadelphia Police Department case12—
which was a sex discrimination case—[they] had about eight women on the 
police force. They were all assigned to the juvenile unit and they were all 
denied the ability to be patrolmen. The juvenile unit obviously paid less. To 
show you how blatant it was, on the way up to Philadelphia, when we got 
there in fact, Mayor Rizzo was on television saying that women would patrol 
the streets of Philadelphia over his dead body. That kind of motivated us on 
that one, too. But the point is that the City of Philadelphia hired an expert who 
did a study that pretty much confi rmed the stereotype on some trumped-up 
psychological basis that women just were not cut out for police work. And that 
was their expert witness, and that was amazing to me that they thought that 
they could convince anybody with that kind of testimony. And indeed, they 
didn’t. I didn’t stay on there—Richard Ugelow, you took that case on when I 
left, didn’t you? We won it, didn’t we? Alright. Alright.
So those are some of the stories, and I will leave it at that and hopefully if 
there are questions, I will try to help answer them. Thank you.
TERRY CONNORS: I think that’s a perfect segue to Vivian, and I wonder 
if you, Vivian, could explain to this group how you became the expert for the 
City of Cincinnati.13
12.  United States v. City of Philadelphia, 573 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1978).
13. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992).
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VIVIAN TOLER: I’m not sure how that happened myself. 
 TERRY CONNORS: But perhaps beyond that, [could 
you] talk about the work of your team over the years, 
which was obviously extremely critical to this effort? 
 VIVIAN TOLER: Yes. Paralegal specialists or research analysts—there 
are numerous things in preparation for trial for the attorneys. A lot of our work 
involved xerox. That was a majority of it in the beginning. We xeroxed our 
hearts out, going to various cities, going through personnel fi les and applicant 
folders. Trying to identify—this was before people were identifi ed by race and 
sex—people by looking at their high school or their college, to see if they went 
to a predominantly black school, and then we would make the identifi cation 
that way. And [then compared] their qualifi cations with the white majority.
Paralegals summarize[d] depositions and went out and searched for 
witnesses; I guess that was after the FBI stopped doing it for us. We used to 
go out there to fi nd witnesses for . . . particular cases. We had one case against 
the Florida Department of Corrections, [w]e had about [sex discrimination] 
and we had paralegals, research analysts [a]t that time, going all over the state 
to the different correction facilities trying to locate witnesses, and we’d do the 
preliminary interview and come back to the attorneys with people we thought 
would make good witnesses and give them that information. 
We’ve had a paralegal . . . go out to a fi re department and take the agility 
test to see how diffi cult that was. A female had to go out and take that test. We 
had one in which a male paralegal had to go into the shower at a Department 
of Corrections, because they said they weren’t letting women be correctional 
offi cers because it would interfere with the privacy of the male prisoners. So 
he had to go out there to show that the guards wouldn’t see the males’ private 
parts while they were taking showers, and it was just a variety of different 
things. 
And in the Chicago police case, I—along with other paralegals in 
the Section—had to go through the disciplinary actions to compare the 
discipline given to white offi cers compared to that given to black offi cers, 
and that was also before we had everything on computer, so we had to go 
through by hand and compare information and jot down our fi ndings. And 
testifying at trial when necessary—I had to testify at that trial in Chicago.14 
I think I spent almost a year off and on in Chicago and I believe the entire 
summer of 1975 I was in Chicago. And I think that about covers it for 
right now. I think I worked on the Cincinnati case with Marybeth, so she 
knows[.]   
 MARYBETH MARTIN: Right. I know the strain. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Then go ahead. 
 
 
14. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
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 MARYBETH MARTIN: Oh, I’ll do it. Vivian Toler was the paralegal 
assigned by the [DOJ] to work on the case. She never was an employee of the 
City of Cincinnati. However, the concentration that we wanted to enter there 
was something that the City had agreed that they needed to do some work 
on and that was basically hiring—hiring black females and Hispanic police 
offi cers. So what we needed to do—and this was even before . . . Adarand15 and 
other decisions that talked about having the factual predicate or the fi ndings—
[was] we put together fi ndings that would show how badly the City needed to 
have goals and timetables; so this was entered into the record. The City took 
about four years to hire anybody. They went into a layoff status. It was not for 
purposes of avoiding the decree as other places had done, but this was simply 
because they were in an economic downturn. So when the City started hiring 
again, that brought on a rush of reverse discrimination cases. One of them was 
the Vogel case.16 We wanted to intervene, but Mr. Turner had some reason that 
we weren’t allowed to intervene. I can’t remember the specifi cs. 
So this was a private case against the City, [and they were] saying these 
goals and timetables needed to be off the books. Vivian’s affi davit was all of 
her standard deviation analysis. This was the bread and butter of a paralegal 
or research analyst’s day, [which] was to sit and do—without a computer, 
remember, this is another time that we did not have computers. So she did 
her analysis, put it into an affi davit, and the Court of Appeals decision came 
out and lo and behold there was Vivian Toler, expert witness for the City of 
Cincinnati. 
So Jim Turner was the fi rst to read this, I believe, and came to my offi ce 
or called me up and said, “We’ve got to object to this. Vivian Toler is an 
employee of the [ELS].” So I called the Court of Appeals clerk’s offi ce, and 
said, “There’s a mistake on this opinion that just came out.” And they said, 
“Are you a party?” And we were—[but] I couldn’t convince the City to say 
that they didn’t hire you as an expert witness. And she had made the case. Her 
affi davit had helped bolster our argument that these goals and timetables were 
indeed needed, so.
TERRY CONNORS: How much did you charge for that, Vivian? 
 MARYBETH MARTIN: I want to know if Vivian is going to get any 
referrals. Have you gotten any calls to serve as an expert witness? Because it 
was an excellent example. Now Vivian is the quintessential research analyst, I 
will say that. She worked—when she did the City of Chicago facts, she was up 
all night. The judge I believe commented—Bob Moore can confi rm this—on 
what excellent work she had done, and ever so quickly. Now my point is that 
there’s a theme underlying all of the discussions this morning and up to right 
now; thank you, Mike, for acknowledging us, and, Doug, you also. 
Paralegals were also on the scene. Secretaries were on the scene. We had 
a big support staff in the Section and nobody knew exactly what research 
analysts did. I think I had an interview with an administrative offi cer in the 
15. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
16. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594.
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Division, and the only question I can remember when I was being hired was: 
are you available to travel? Well, little did I know how job related that was. 
I think I was kind of a hazy fi gure to people around the Section, because I 
spent most of my three and a half years as a research analyst in Birmingham, 
Alabama. Or Inslie, Fairfi eld, or Pratt City. One of those towns in which the 
U.S. Steel’s Fairfi eld worked. Nine mills were located [there]. And I had to 
learn the difference between all the nine mills and the lines of progression 
in each of the mills. They had all been totally segregated up until the time at 
which . . . U.S. Steel thought it would solve its problems by creating a pool 
down at the bottom. So you lost your line of promotion seniority so that you’d 
have the opportunity to hopefully get into another line. Well there weren’t any 
jobs. Or not enough jobs for this to happen smoothly. So that’s one reason we 
got involved. 
Now another thing I will say, because we had paralegals and research 
analysts, and I understand the word just—the title—changed. I’m not sure 
there was any use of something called a research analyst before it was used in 
our Section. I keep hearing that we were the innovators there in the Section, 
and I hope that’s the case, because I think that it was a wonderful job category 
to do anything that was needed to get ready for a case.
Now what this meant was, yes, we did a lot of interviews. We did the 
interviews that the FBI basically didn’t want to do or the lawyers didn’t want 
the FBI to do for some reason. We also went . . . without our government suits 
on—because at that time all the research analysts were female and we would 
be a little bit less intimidating sometimes than some of the lawyers. So we had 
some of our interviewees tell us that they preferred talking to us. And [this] 
worked out well when we got ready for trial. We also had a number of records 
to look at almost every case. This goes to the factual development of the case 
that we’ve talked about being so important, and it was critical; it really was 
critical. [W]ell Kate Green, for instance, in the late [19]70s, I believe had a 
responsibility in a case [called] United States vs. County of Fairfax17—one 
of the wealthiest counties in the nation. The records for applications I believe 
were stored in shoeboxes that were pushed under a table in the personnel 
offi ce, and they were in no order. That’s what we had to deal with.
A lot of records were in any number of different places; they had different 
codes. Charlotte and Logan, I believe in Detroit Edison,18 found a dot curiously 
behind certain names and learned that oh, that means this is the internal code 
for “that’s a black applicant.” I had to deal with a case in which I was seeing 
the word peachy written by some names. That was a little bit more evident, I 
suppose. But anyway we had to learn these records inside out. [Let’s go] back 
to U.S. Steel, 19 where I spent a lot of my time.
17. 629 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1980).
18. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d sub nom. 
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977) 
(remanding for further consideration in light of Supreme Court’s decision in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (citation omitted)).
19. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
218        THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM                 [Vol. 1:1
 We had not only interviewed all the black steel workers; we knew all the 
lines of promotion, who was where, and we had a curious delay in the trial. 
There were fi fty-fi ve trial days over—Lou and Bob could tell me precisely—
[t]wo years, I believe. Well, there was a delay for the defendants after we’d put 
on our case; they were working on some big project over at the law fi rm, and 
it turns out that they brought in an expert witness. We didn’t have any experts 
up until that time on this case. The expert witness had something called a 
regression analysis. We had never heard of a regression analysis at this point, 
so we were curious to see this.  Well it was a big printout and it showed that 
while we were saying race made the difference—ah-ha—you need to look 
further. There are other factors at work. One of those factors was education. 
Now it wouldn’t surprise anybody to know that black steelworkers typically 
did not have the same level of education as white steel workers, but these 
are steel working jobs. And education is not necessarily something that is 
translatable into most of the work in the steel mills. 
But we had interviewed—the paralegals had interviewed—all of 
the black steelworkers. We knew when we looked at this closely, their 
education levels aren’t even right. Some were too high, some were too 
low—they [were] just [in]correct. What did we do? We brought in about 
fi fty steelworkers to testify to the inaccuracy of the data they were using 
for their regression analysis, and the judge, who was very much attuned to 
mathematical analysis, Judge Pointer, tossed out the exhibit. That was their 
major work, I’d have to say—I don’t think they put up any resistance after 
that, but it was just a good example for me of how facts are important. 
 TERRY CONNORS: The Department actually paid 
you for all that time in Alabama? 
 
 MARYBETH MARTIN: No. I got per diem; it was twenty-fi ve dollars a day.
 TERRY CONNORS: Actually—  
 MARYBETH MARTIN: And overtime. 
 MIKE MIDDLETON: [You received] overtime?
 TERRY CONNORS: In 19— 
 MARYBETH MARTIN: We did get overtime. 
 MIKE MIDDLETON: We didn’t. 
 JERRY GEORGE: We didn’t. 
 TERRY CONNORS: [That’s a] good point, because someone brought us 
up to 1974, I believe, in the initial phase, and there was a group of us that 
went over to the EEOC on detail, when the transfer occurred, and were asked 
to put cases together in ninety days in the style we had done at the Justice 
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Department and I recall going to tak[e] a team to Cincinnati to investigate a 
major consumer products company that will remain unnamed. And my plan 
was that we would go on Tuesday and we would return when we were fi nished. 
And, of course, that we would be fi nding people at home at night and over 
the weekend and so on and so forth, and the team said “wait a minute.” The 
point of this is young lawyers and law students, when you are dedicated [to] 
something like this, [will] work as much as it takes to get this done and I think 
this is the theme throughout all of our lives at the [ELS]. And Jerry, tell us 
about fi re departments and police departments and your experience.
JERRY GEORGE: Well, police and fi re departments, they’re sort of like 
construction unions; they’re kind of my people. I’m from Indiana; I was 
working class. [I went] to Catholic schools. As I say, the guys in the police 
and fi re departments were my people; I knew them. Before I get into that, one 
of the themes I think that’s coming out of this is that in the [ELS], I think in 
the Civil Rights Division generally, [it] wasn’t lawyers; it was a team. It was 
lawyers; it was research analysts and secretaries. We traveled together; we 
worked together; we partied together. We made very effective teams, and it’s 
because we didn’t have any artifi cial barriers between job classifi cations. This 
wasn’t even a consideration. People did. Everybody worked on everything. 
And Dave Rose was key to that. And he always had our back. I always felt he 
had my back and I got one story on that which I would like to tell.
In the mid [19]80s, when I was suing —and had been suing for several years, 
off and on—the San Francisco Police Department,20 there was [a] promotional 
exam coming up and it was no different than the promotional exam that I had 
stopped two years earlier, and [so I] informed the Chief Deputy City Attorney 
and I said, you know, under our consent decree, you guys [can’t] go—I’m 
objecting; I’m writing you a letter telling you to stop the exam. Unfortunately 
there [was] some turmoil in the City Attorney’s offi ce at the time and that 
the person I had spoken with departed without ever telling anybody he 
was supposed to stop the examination. And we came up around in 1986, 
Thanksgiving week. I sent off my letter; I stopped the examination and the 
then mayor, now a Senator, called a friend of hers, George Bush, who was Vice 
President, at his home in Kennebunkport for the holidays; who then called Ed 
Meese; who then called Brad Reynolds. Who then called Dave Rose. And then 
the day after Thanksgiving, when I was at my mother’s house, he called me; 
asked me what was going on, [and] I explained what had happened, and you 
know, nothing ever happened out of that. I understand that the mayor spoke to 
Brad, and Brad—she started yelling at Brad, Brad started yelling at her, they 
hung up on each other and nothing further happened. But I never had to worry 
about political interference as long as Dave was my Section chief, and it made 
a huge difference given the particular dealing[s] with police and fi re litigation, 
which [were] extremely politically sensitive. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. City of San Francisco, Nos. C-84-7089-MHP & C-84-
7694-MHP, 1986 WL 68546, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1986).
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 Police and fi re—why did we do so many police and fi re cases? Well, police 
and fi re departments in this country historically were all white and all male. 
There were in some cities [where] you might have had a few blacks, a few 
Hispanics, but often they would have segregated assignments, segregated 
facilities. And these are really well paid jobs that have low entry requirements. 
They hire eighteen year-old kids and they train them to be fi refi ghters; they 
train them to be police offi cers. You don’t need to be an electrician; you don’t 
need to be a sheet metal worker. You start out with no skills at all; they train 
you and it’s a very good living. 
Now, if you’re also wondering why the fi re department [i]n New York might 
have a lot fewer minorities than the police department. Firefi ghters in most big 
cities work eight days a month. They’re twenty-four hour shifts, but they’re 
sleeping in the fi rehouse during most of those shifts. I often thought I missed 
my calling; I went into the wrong profession. It is a fabulous job, and most of 
these guys have two jobs. And they’ll work through their fi refi ghting career 
and then retire and go to their second job full-time. But they’ll have two full-
time jobs. They can easily work two full-time jobs depending on what kind 
of job it was. There were fi refi ghters in Chicago; there’d be four of them that 
would have a union—they would have a union job, a construction job, [which] 
they would work among the four of them. Whoever had a day off would work 
that day—they are terrifi c jobs. They have terrifi c . . . salaries, good benefi ts, 
and very good retirement.
Another element that made these this kind of litigation a little different than 
dealing with the industrial and union cases that I dealt with [was] the fact that 
you have the civil service “merit” system. (I would put quotes around merit.) 
It’s a different kind of process. At a company you can go in any time and apply 
for the job. When you’re talking about police and fi re entry level jobs, they 
all accept applications maybe—they might be doing it once every fi ve years. 
They’ll go out, they’ll rig, they’ll run a selection process, and they accept 
applications, [and] they go take the multiple choice test, the physical agility 
test, they’ll interview, create an eligibility list, that eligibility list will rank 
maybe 500 people, and that will be in place for several years. And they either 
run out of people on the list, [or] it expires. And then they go through the process 
again. So you have to be motivated to get those jobs. And they are politically 
sensitive. I mean, these are the people that are responsible for the protection of 
the community: your homes, your families, [and] your businesses. So people 
are very concerned about the quality of their fi re and police departments. But 
it’s also very important that those fi re and police departments be representative 
of the communities they’re serving, and that they be perceived as actually 
serving that community and not [be]—as many police departments were, and 
maybe still are—occupying forces.
They also were politically sensitive because they have extremely strong 
unions that are very politically savvy. They have a lot of time, they have a lot 
of money, and they have a lot at stake in preserving the status quo. So when we 
fi led these cases, we’re dealing with the cities—and maybe the politics in the 
city might be to resolve this matter, but the politicians in the city had to take 
into account the political threat from the police and fi re unions. So that made 
them a little harder to deal with.
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Now I talk about the myth of “merit” selection. You know, [a] lot of these 
departments were just historically all white. If they had any blacks, they just 
[would]—even [in] some of the northern and western cities [they] would have 
a few blacks, Hispanics—[have] segregated assignments. The city of Los 
Angeles—[the] liberal left coast—had two black fi re houses. And the area of 
all the other fi re houses were whites; all of these departments would have 
male only policies. They would not—just would not—even allow a woman to 
apply for a fi refi ghter job or a police offi cer’s job. On police offi cers—police 
departments—there were no street cops. You might have a policewoman 
category or a matron category to deal with prisoners; maybe to serve undercover 
on vice squad or something, but they were not considered police offi cers.
A story I heard [a]bout the Philadelphia Police Department was that when 
the Director was deposed, he was explaining that there were two badges for 
the Philadelphia Police Department. You had the badge for the police offi cers, 
and then the badge for the dogs, horses, and policewomen. In the L.A. Police 
Department, at a dinner for the policewoman’s organization, there were about 
a hundred policewomen I think at the time on the L.A.P.D. The police chief at 
the time said he thought there was room for about twenty policewomen. And 
I don’t know why he thought that was a good audience to say that to, but that 
was the situation that existed at the time we got authority to start suing these 
employers.
In addition to these policies there [was] a lot of what you would call 
“institutional head-winks.” The standard they were all using—standards 
unrelat[ed] to job performance—[such as] multiple choice tests [that] would 
consistently have adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics. Blacks and 
Hispanics would always score, or not always, well—always—pretty much, 
one standard deviation below the white mean. If you’re using it as pass/fail, 
that’s bad enough, but if you’re using the written test as a ranking device, forget 
it. You’re not going to be hiring any blacks or Hispanics. Physical strength and 
agility tests—they would use those to screen out female candidates once formal 
sex requirements were eliminated. There were minimum height requirements, 
usually in the fi ve-foot-six to fi ve-foot-nine range, which would eliminate 
at least ninety percent of the women, and eliminate Asians and Hispanics at 
twice the rate of white males. And then [there were] background checks; use 
of factors, such as arrest records without convictions that had disproportionate 
impact on minorities, and often they were just subjectively applied. If your 
dad’s a cop they may not even bother to check your background, particularly, 
you know, if he had a bad patch when he was a teenager but he’s fi ne now. If 
you were a minority and you had an arrest record, you’re out of there. 
And then the last thing was just the process itself. Like I said, they might 
have an eligibility list that would exist for fi ve years, [so] then you wouldn’t 
know if you missed that start date; you’re just going to have to wait around. 
And who waits around—unless you’re really motivated to be a police offi cer 
or a fi refi ghter? In addition you have this multiple step process where you 
fi rst apply, then they’ll send you a notice of the written test. Come in and take 
the written test. [We’ll] send you the results of the written test. Then later 
they’ll schedule the physical agility test. They’ll send you another notice. You 
come in for the physical agility test. Then, after that, same thing for the oral 
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interview. And then maybe, then they’ll have the eligibility list, and then if 
you’ve got 500 names on it, they probably won’t run the background [checks 
until] they’re getting ready to hire somebody, so they’re going to hire twenty 
people, maybe they’ll take [the] fi rst sixty names on the list and send them a 
notice to come in and fi ll out the forms for the background check. So if you’re 
in the second sixty names, you might not hear anything for two years after 
you’ve got yourself on the list. 
So none of this is a problem if your dad’s a police offi cer [and] your six 
cousins are all [in] the department. You know, when things are ready to happen, 
they’ll let you know. You need to move, you change your address, you know; 
they make sure civil service knows about it. But if you’re not in that game, then 
it can be a real problem. And people move; they forget to tell somebody about 
the change of address, they don’t get notice, and they’re off the list. Or it’s been 
three, four years, they forgot they even applied for the job. So if you wonder 
why, if you have a merit system, you still end up with situations where the bulk 
of the people on the police or the fi re department are all related to each other, 
that’s how it happens. It’s a merit system. It’s a transparent system, but it’s set 
up in such a way that unless you’ve got a comparable organizational effort 
for the minority communities, they’re going to fall to the wayside. In terms of 
litigating stuff, what we really did [wasn’t]—most of what we actually actively 
litigated—the height requirements and that sort of thing [because those] just 
went. You know, people understood they couldn’t defend them. I only had one 
that ever got litigated.21 They brought in an expert to talk about why the North 
Carolina Highway Patrol [used that type of requirement],  and we had a case 
that only went two days, because the judge had gone to the University of North 
Carolina and he wanted to go to the basketball game that night. He let the trial 
go over to the next day. It took a couple more hours of testimony, and then 
[he] ruled from the bench. But they put their expert on the stand, and the most 
amazingly bad thing about it was that this guy gets on with his report talking 
about why this fi ve-foot nine-inch height requirement was absolutely required 
to be a good, successful State Trooper. And you know, I knew that fi ve years 
earlier, he had a one page report, and I had in my hands this transcript from the 
case fi ve years earlier in California where he had testifi ed for a plaintiff against 
a height requirement, and had gone on at great length about just how you could 
never defend a minimum height requirement for a trooper position.
So it was fun, I [have] got to admit. But it was not diffi cult. In terms of 
challenging written tests—and I think this is still an issue, because we’re still 
doing it, and they’re still giving the same kinds of exams. As I said, they’ll 
always have adverse impact. The evidence of job relation in those early days 
often was not much more than well, of course, it’s a good test; I mean it says this 
is a test for a police offi cer. That’s what it says on the fi rst page. So that’s what 
it does; it tests for a police offi cer. And it didn’t get a lot more sophisticated 
than that. [I]f they did try to validate test performance against job performance, 
they would typically use training academy performance because they had no 
good measures of actual job performance. Everybody was satisfactory. And if 
21.  United States v. North Carolina, No. 75-0328-CIV-5, 1981 WL 232 (E.D.N.C. 
Feb. 17, 1981).
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you’re correlating against a written test against another written test, you would 
expect probably to get about a point three correlation; and that was about the 
best any of the cases I saw ever did, was to get about a point three correlation 
between written test performance and academy performance.
On promotional exams, they didn’t even have that, because they didn’t 
have any job performance data at all. So they would say that they built these 
tests using a “doing a good job” analysis and the content of the test matched 
the content of the job. [That’s what’s] called content validation. And our 
response to these was to fi rst tear apart their job analyses, because these are 
typically very superfi cial job analyses done by inexperienced analysts; nobody 
had ever questioned them before in terms of their ability to do these jobs, 
and if you cross-examined them, you could trip them up fairly easily. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Jerry, isn’t that true in the Ricci 
case,22 as well, but it never got to the record, I think? 
 JERRY GEORGE: I suspect it’s true. I doubt that the test was any better 
than any of the stuff I saw. And test [content], typically would be irrelevant 
to job content, even on the promotional exams. I mean they looked like 
they were relevant, but if you started asking people about [it]—“So what 
would you do with this information on the job?”—[they] typically had no 
idea. It made no difference. And these are highly physical jobs—in terms 
of fi refi ghter[s and] even police offi cer[s]—and on the promotion[s], the 
difference between the guys who were successfully performing at the entry 
level and their offi cers is leadership potential and there’s nothing on those 
written tests that’s going to measure any of those leadership traits. 
 TERRY CONNORS: Jerry, in the interest of time, [would you] run down 
the results on the San Francisco [and] L.A. cases?23
JERRY CONNORS: Well, all right. Well, L.A., as I said, had historically 
segregated fi rehouses [until] 1956. Then the department—the fi re chief—
said the watchword within the department was integrate and eliminate. 
And so they had internal segregation within those fi rehouses. What all of 
us had some experience with [was] the black bed. If you’re at a fi re house, 
you’ve got four, fi ve people on the crew [that] live in [the] fi re house. [I]
f there was a black on the crew, there was a bed he was supposed to sleep 
in, and then when the next crew came in, the black on that crew would have 
to sleep in that same bed. They were not allowed to eat in the supper clubs. 
They all fi xed meals together and [would] eat together in the fi re houses, but 
the blacks were not allowed to eat with the whites [and] were not allowed 
to socialize with the whites. They could only [be] with the whites at the 
22. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
23. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1979); United States 
v. City of San Francisco, Nos. C-84-7089-MHP & C-84-7694-MHP, 1986 WL 68546, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1986); Offi cers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 473 
F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
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fi re scene. And the whites were told that they could not talk to the black 
fi refi ghters, because, the Chief said, “If people talk, they’ll argue. People 
argue, they’ll fi ght, and I’m not going to have any interracial fi ghts.” 
 TERRY CONNORS: And that’s the last word. 
 JERRY GEORGE: And the witness who was going to say all 
this was a black fi refi ghter who went to law school while he was on 
the fi re department, and by the time we were ready to go to trial his 
chief was the head of the Los Angeles Civil Service Commission. 
 TERRY CONNORS: [J]ust as a wrap, because I want to do it publicly, 
I endorse completely what a great thing it was, what a great example Dave 
Rose was to all of us and what a great man and a great lawyer he is. 
 RICHARD UGELOW: Before we take a break for the next panel, you’ve 
heard a lot about Dave Rose today and the culture he created and established 
in the [ELS], and I say in the entire Civil Rights Division, particularly in 
the [ELS]. We were trained by Dave. [Since] Dave left, our successors have 
continued that—that same work ethic and culture [w]ill carry on. And as 
you’ve heard Tom Perez say, [the] Civil Rights Division is open for business 
again, and I’m sure the [ELS] is open for business, but hopefully, in the same 
tradition that Dave created, and that will carry on in [the] future, we have 
as a token of our appreciation to you. And I want to give credit to Lorna 
Grenevere who, as you know, was always the heart and soul of the set. 
 
           END TRANSCRIPT
